FEELIX GROWING

Discrete models:
In discrete models, emotions are the result of a selective adaptation that ensure survival (Darwin 1872). This survival advantage could be illustrated by the following relation: danger → fear → escape → survival. The result of this selection is a small set of basic, innate and universal emotions. For instance, Ekman (1970) proposed 6 basic emotions identified on the basis of facial expressions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise. Different models have been proposed which include more or less basic emotions, usually from 2 to 10 (Tomkins 1962, Ekman 1970, Izard 1971, Plutchik 1980,...). These emotions are called primary emotions in opposition to secondary emotions which result from a combination of primary ones (e.g. contempt = anger + disgust). From a developmental point of view, basic emotions may be the first emotions infants could experience (Watson 1930).
Dimensional models:
In dimensional models, emotions are defined as a position in a continuous multidimensional space where each dimension stands for a fundamental property common to all emotions. That kind of model was already used by Wilhelm Wundt (Wundt 1905). Over the years, a large number of dimensions has been proposed (Schlosberg 1954, Osgood & al. 1957, Davitz 1969, Lang & al. 1998, Panksepp 1998, Breazeal 2003,...). Two of the most accepted dimensions were described by Russel (Russel 1980): valence (positive versus negative affect) and arousal (low versus high level of activation). This variety of dimensions could be seen as the different expressions of a very small set of basic concepts. Most of these models include two dimensions.
Appraisal models:
In appraisal models, emotions are defined as the evaluation of the interaction between someone's goals, beliefs, ..., and his environment. This appraisal automatically leads to emotion. The person copes with feelings by taking internal or external actions to improve/maintain the relationship between his goals and the environment. For example, frustration results from a goal that is not satisfied by occurring events of the environment. That kind of models was introduced by Arnold (Arnold 1950) and has been developed and refined until then (Lazarus 1968, Scherer 1981, Roseman 1984, Smith & al. 1985, Frijda 1986, Ortony & al. 1988, ...).
Neurobiological models:
There is a wide range of neurobiological emotion models. They have in common the fact that they involve many different brain structures like the amygdala, the accumbens, the septum, the hippocampus, the hypothalamus, the thalamus, the basal ganglia, the prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the ventral striatum, the insula,... This diversity of neurobiological models reflects the diversity of functional emotions models we have described so far.
Most of these models focuses on the understanding of one emotion at a time (e.g. fear), trying to identify the specific network of brain structures which underlies it thus giving a neurobiological echo to discrete models.
On the other hand, some neurobiological models reject the discrete point of view and give credits to dimensional models underlining the relevance of a set of brain structures underlying each specific dimension (Posner & al. 2005).
Dynamical system model:
Think emotions as a dynamical process.
Question: nature of the basic elements (basic emotions?).
Strong compatibility with a developmental perspective (growing complexity of the dynamics, higher order coupling between meta control dynamics and expressivity of the emotions)
Open questions and considerations:
All these models are not systematically exclusive from each other.
Is there a specific neurobiological model for each basic emotion? What adequacy could we find between functional and neurobiological models knowing that to each different family of functional model, a corresponding neurobiological model exists?
If discrete models arise from an evolutionary perspective, what could we say about dimensional model from the same point of view?
Intercultural argument against basic emotions (Smith & al. 2007):
This empirical intercultural study aims at pointing out the lack of relevance of the basic emotion concept. It shows that intercultural differences are more important than intracultural differences between genders (questioning their universal aspect) and that are no significant difference between primary en secondary emotions (questioning their specificity).
Do emotions have to be understood dynamically? It may be useful to take in account concepts like mood and personality (see Egges 2003 for an implemented model).
Bibliography:
Arnold, M. B. (1950). An excitatory theory of emotion.
Breazeal, C. (2003). Emotion and sociable humanoid robots.
Darwin, C. (1872).The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.
Davitz, J.R. (1969). The language of emotion.
Egges, A., Kshirsagar, S. & Magnenat-Thalmann, N. (2003). A Model for Personality and Emotion Simulation.
Ekman, P. (1970). Universal facial expressions of emotion.
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions.
Izard, C. (1971). The face of emotion.
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Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning.
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions.
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Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect.
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